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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, a limited partner-
ship, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. NO. 19096 
ROLLINS, BROWN & GUNNELL, 
INC., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE MAURICE HARDING, JUDGE, and 
HONORABLE DAVID SAM, JUDGE, presiding. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages resulting from the mis-staking 
of property owned by the plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
This matter was tried to a jury, Maurice Harding, District 
Judge pro tern, presiding, on November 17-19, 1980. The jury re-
a verdict for the plaintiff and assessed damages of 
$30,UOO.OU. R.101, 107. Judge Harding subsequently granted the 
-1-
defendant's motion for a new trial. R. 14 0. 
set for trial, before David Sam, District Judge, 0'.1 Marcl1 l, 
At the time set for trial, the court ruled, sua spo:1te, that 
John Price Associates, I:lc., the party with whom the defeCJdinr 
had contracted, was an i'1dispensable party, and ordered that 
the case be dismissed unless the plai:ltiff amended its compla:-
to add John Price Associates, Inc., as an i'1dispensable party 
to the action. R.147-48. The plaintiff elected :lot to ame1d 
the complaint, and the action was therefore dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent urges that the trial court's decisio'.1 be 
affirmed in all respects. If, however, this court determiCJes 
that the trial court's decision should be reversed, the matter 
should be remanded for a new trial on all issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime during the first part of July, 1973, John Price 
Associates, Inc., (JPA), contracted with the defe:lda:-it t11 have 
survey done of the site of the Orem Plaza, a shoppi:1g ce:lter 
owned and developed by Price-Orem I:1vestme:1t Compa:1y, a lim1te' 
partnership. R.183, 192, 210. The shoppi:1g ce:lter was coCJ-
structed by John Price Associates, I:lc. R.192, 208. Joh:-i 
Price, the i'1dividual, was the sole ge:1eral part:ler of Price-
Orem Investment Company. The limited part:lers wete 
corporations of Joh'.1 Price. R.207. Age:lts •Jt the dete'.1da'.1t 
performed the survey i'.1 accorda:lce with the terms nt the cn1-
tract. R. 319. 
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slaKe the layuut of the shopping center building. R. 209-11, 
l)J. Mr. Brown, a c0nsultin•J enyineer and a principal of 
the defendant, testified that the starting point for staking 
the layout of a building is usually furnished by the building 
owner. R. 3 7 5. Mr. Thurgood, the engineer in charge of the 
surveying crew which staked the building layout, R. 322, met 
with Mr. Marshall, the JOb super intendant for the plaintiff, 
prior to performing thee staking. R. 410. Mr. Marshall had 
already prepared the base for the structure upon which the stak-
ing was to be laid out. The base consisted of a gravel bed 
which had been located from a stake which Marshall had selected 
as a starting point. R. 421, 426. Mr. Thurgood confirmed 
measurements from a starting point stake labeled 
"".w. property corner." R. 41 3. The stake had been well pre-
served, and was marked off by flagging and other stakes around 
it, R. 413-15, and there was other evidence that at least two 
other persons had used that stake as the northwest property 
corner. R. 426. Based on that starting point, Mr. Thurgood 
and h1s crew staked the building layout. R. 416. The build-
ing layout as staked fit properly on top of fill material 
which had already been placed Dy JPA. R. 421, 254-55. 
'1r. rhur1ci«cJ t•cst1t1eci that the procedures he used in 
stak1nrd the bt11l 1111'-1 layc-iut were in accL1rdance with the custom 
R. 4 2 4. 
Tcitccr c'ven ,,_,,µd]c'd tl1dt Ll1e stake used by Mr. Thurgood 
...... ,1:-; n('t '--'nrrier ir1lt:>nded tJ'y' the owner which by reason of the 
s11r-l<..;t:> ;111·r1t ·"''-';u1s1t i,1n ·w3s about 30 feet to the north. 
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R. 414. As a result, the building was staked about thirty t-. 
south of the location called for on the site plan. 
The problem resulted from these facts. In July ot 197 J, 
the plaintiff, by purchase order, employed the defendant tc 
survey the boundaries of plaintiff's property. The defendant 
made the survey but it was determined that the deed line and 
fence line did not fit. The plaintiff, therefore, by neqotiat1 
acquired additional property north of its fence line. Plaint1:: 
then tore down the fence and graded the property north of the 
fence line shown on the survey. (See Exhibit 4). The fact 
that such additional property was acquired and which moved the 
plaintiff's property north some thirty feet was never revealed 
to the plaintiff. R. 260. When Mr. Thurgood went to the site 
to do the staking, he did not take the survey documents with 
him, believing that he was merely to lay out the construction 
grid at the place selected by the plaintiff. R. 423-24. That 
grid, so far as he was concerned, had no bearing on the 
although he did talk with Mr. Marshall as to how he had 
the location and inspected the stake labeled "N.W. property 
corner." R. 415-16. 
When Mr. Thurgood discovered the error, he notified his 
superiors and notified the plaintiff. R. 418-19. Mr. Brown 
testified that he inspected the property about the f 1 rst ,,t 
September, 1973, R. 328-30, and noteri what asµects ut c<>nstn. 
tion had been completed at that time. R. 333. He est 1mdt,_>, 
that the total amount of concrete µoured at tr1,it t 11ne \·1a'° 
about thirty-eight cubic yards in the tr)ul 111,;s .Ji1'1 JCn 1Jt 
one hundred fifty-three yarrJs in tt1,, sl.1t''-'· 
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p. 
observed that no electrical work and very little plumbing had 
been installed. R.337, Mr. Brown then developed two pro-
posals for correcting the mislocation of the building. R.336. 
He estimated that the corrections would cost about three 
thousand dollars, R.340, and would take about ten days to 
complete. R. 341. 
Mr. Brown's suggestions and other suggestions for correct-
ing the problem were presented to Mr. Price at a meeting on 
September 13, 1974. R.341. The original complaint in this 
matter, seeking $825,000.00 in damages, had been filed a few 
days earlier. R.436. Mr. Price did not give serious con-
sideration to any of the defendant's proposals, but summarily 
dismissed each one. R.341-44, 437. JPA redesigned the 
building to shorten it by thirty feet, R.204, and sought to 
recover for the resulting loss of twenty one hundred square 
feet. 
Substantial competent evidence was presented concerning 
the amount of parking required for the complex. Both Mr. 
Brown, who spent his full time as a consulting engineer for 
Orem City and was famllcar with the ordinances relating to 
shopplng center construction, R.349, and Mr. Deschamps, the 
p!a·n:-iJ director for Orem City durc<g the relevant time 
[Jer'."d, P.389, testified that 596 parkieig spaces were re-
1uired for the shoppincJ complex as fieially coc.structed. 
_c_ 
R,360, 397. The number of parking spaces actually provided, 
however, was only 490. See also R.401. 
The matter was submitted to the jury, which returned a 
verdict for the plaintiff and assessed the damages of thirty 
thousand dollars. R.101. The defendant moved for Judgment 
N.O.V., or in the alternative for a remittitur or a new 
trial, R.126, and the court granted a new trial. R.140. 
The plaintiff then moved for reconsideration of the grant 
of a new trial, and the defendant moved to amend its answer. 
On May 15, 1981, the court granted the defendant's motion 
to amend, denied the plaintiff's motion to reconsider, and 
reaffirmed its grant of a new trial, stating as the basis 
therefor that "the damages were excessive" and that there 
was "no culpable negligence on the part of the engineers." 
Prior to the second trial this defendant was allowed 
to file an amended answer wherein it denied any mis-staking 
and among other defenses alleged the failure to join real 
parties in interest. 
The new trial was scheduled before Judge David Sam on 
March 1, 1983. On the suggestion of the defendant, the 
court ruled, sua sponte, that John Price Associates, Inc., 
was a necessary and indispensable party to the action. The 
court ordered that the plaintiff could amend its complaint 
within ten days, or the action would be dismissed. R.147-4Y. 
The plaintiff elected not to amend, and thereafter perfected 
its appeal. R.150. 
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A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED 
WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A VERDICT FOR THE DEFENDANT; 
THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF A NEW TRIAL SHOULD 
THEREFORE BE AFFIRMED. 
After reviewing the trial transcript and two rounds of 
briefs submitted by the parties, and after hearing oral argu-
ments on the matter, Judge Maurice Harding determined that 
the defendant's motion for a new trial should be granted. The 
reasons given were that the damages were excessive and that 
there was no culpable negligence on the part of the defendant. 
That decision should be upheld on appeal if the record contains 
"substantial competent evidence" which would support a verdict 
for the defendant. Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 
1982). 
"Substantial competent evidence" is of course not capable 
of precise definition. Dairyland Insurance Co. v. Holder, 
641 P.2d 136 (Utah 1982), supports the inference that any 
admissible evidence greater than a mere scintilla constitutes 
substantial competent evidence. See also Helman v. Sacred 
Heart Hospital, 62 wash. 2d 136, 381 P.2d 605, 612-13 (1963). 
In Utah State Road Commission v. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 888 
(Utah 19751, the court defined "substantial evidence" as 
follows: 
In dealing with that problem, we recognize 
that neither the trial court, nor this reviewing 
court, should trespass upon the prerogative 
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of the jury by applying a subjective measure of 
our own ideas of "reasonableness" and reject-
ing as not "substantial" any evidence which fails 
to meet that test. Allowance should be made f '' 
the fact that there is a comparatively wide orbit 
through which reasonable minds may swing; and 
that what may be considered reasonable in the 
broad sense need not necessarily fit into the 
exact pattern of our own thought. In the time 
honored and universally accepted rule that a find-
ing or verdict must be supported by substantial 
evidence, the modifying adjective "substantial" 
has been used advisedly to indicate a higher de-
gree of proof than just any evidence of any ki1a. 
The requirement is that the evidence must be 
sufficient in amount and credibility that, when 
considered in connection with the other evidence 
and circumstances shown in the case, would Justify 
some, but not necessarily all, reasonable minds 
acting fairly thereon; to believe it to be the 
truth. And conversely, if when so considered, 
the court is convinced that it is so inconse-
quential, or so clearly lacking in credibility, 
that no jury acting fairly and reasonably could 
so believe, it cannot properly be regarded as 
substantial evidence. 
533 P.2d at 890 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). 
The record in this case clearly contains substantial 
tent evidence which would justify a verdict for the defendant. 
A. The Defendant Was Not Negligent. One of the bases 
for the trial court's ruling was that "there was no culpable 
negligence on the part of the engineers." The court's con-
clusion certainly finds substantial supporting competent ev:-
dence in the record; indeed, there is no substantial evidence 
to the conti;ary. 
The plaintiff states on page 16 of its briet that "[t]ne 
evidence is undisputed that the [northwest propett/ 
rebar and wooden stake were placed by the detendant," and 
that " [ t] he evidence is 1 ikewise undisputed t :1dt the -1,H th wee· 
property corner was marked about thirty teet .t Lhc, 
-
l-id:cated by the survey." The plaintiff then argues that 
hecause the detendant in :ts original answer admitted making a 
m:stake, the defendant :s l:able for any consequences of that 
mistake. 
The defendant now denies having made a mistake. Assuming, 
arguendo,that a mistake was made, the plaintiff's contention 
might be val:d if th:s were a contract case, and if the proper 
µarty were the plaintiff. The defendant m:ght then be liable, 
even if not negligent, for breach of contract. The plaintiffs 
stoutly maintained, however, that its case sounded in tort, not 
contract (R. 192), and it was so treated by the trial court 
( R. 4 56). The plaintiff was, therefore, required to prove not 
Just that the defendant made a mistake, but that the defendant 
was negligent, and that the negl:gence proximately caused in-
Jury to the plaint:tf. 
Mr. Thurgood, the engineer in charge of the survey crew 
which staked the building, test:f ied that he, in conjunction 
with Mr. Marshall, the Job superintendant for the plaintiff, 
selected a stake marked "N.W. Property Corner" as the starting 
po:nt for staking the building. R.413-16, 428. Mr. Thurgood 
and Mr. Marshall selected that stake as a starting point be-
cause it had been set off and by flagging. 
There were several other ind:cat:ons wh:ch led Mr. 
R.413. 
urc:rood to '1e l ievP th;:i t he 1-Ja s i rig i.vi th the correct 
start: 1,j ,"1:,t, ::1clli<1i:1,] the fact tnat the property corners 
:;s stakc"1 t :tLt',1 ·1eatly o-i t''P ot the f:ll work which had 
R.421, 426. 
l.CJtµt c>ve-its revea)e,J tnat the startiny po:nt used was 
t1:,1ll', nt the r1e1.,, 1orthwest property 
corner. R.418. The plaintiff claims that this thirty foot 
offset was a result of the defendant's negligence in 
to select the correct starting point. The plaintiff also 
apparently argues that the defendant was negligent at a much 
earlier stage, in doing the initial survey of the property 
and in placing the survey pegs relied upon by Mr. Thurgood. 
The fact is that the plaintiff had already used the "'uunceous 
stake for laying out the construction base and all the de-
fendant was required to do by i t.s pur-chase order was to stake 
the foundation dimensions. It was not employed to locate 
the foundation upon the plaintiff's property. R.256, ex. 7. 
No expert testimony (or other evidence) was presented 
by the plaintiff concerning the standards of care applicable 
to the surveying and engineering professions. The standard 
of care required for a surveyor is not within the common 
knowledge of lay persons, and expert testimony on the subject 
was therefor-e necessary to establish a prima facie case of 
negligence. National Housing Industries, Inc. v. E.L. Jones 
Development Co., 118 Ariz. 374, 576 P.2d 1374 (Ct. App. 
1978); Carter & Company, Inc. v. McGee, 213 so. 2d 89 (La. 
Ct. App. 1968). See also Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 
347 P.2d 1108 (1959). 
Mr. Thurgood, an expert witness qualified to testify 01 
the subject, testified for the defendant that the procedures 
that he used to stake the building were correct (R.424), anJ 
that, if presented with the same situation again, he would 
perform the staking exactly as he did the first time. R. 4 2 b. 
- ) I)-
With the exception of Mr. Price's argumentative outburst, that 
there was "no engineer in the world that would stake out a 
building without a survey" (R. 258), there was no evidence 
that the survey was not performed with due care in accordance 
with established surveying techniques, or that it was in any 
other respect negligently performed. 
In addition, there was also evidence from which reasonable 
minds could have concluded that, arguendo, regardless of any 
alleged problems with the initial survey, the ultimate mis-
staking was the proximate result of the plaintiff's failure 
to preserve all the stakes from the initial survey, or that 
the plaintiff had itself mislocated its foundation or had con-
sented and approved the use of the "incorrect" stake for that 
purpose. R. 413-15, 418 ( 1. 22-24), 426. There was no evi-
dence as to whether the stake marking the correct northwest 
property corner was still in existence at the time Mr. 
Thurgood performed the staking of the building grid. Mr. 
Thurgood testified he observed nothing in the area of the 
correct northwest corner. R.415. 
Where the plaintiff presented no expert testimony as 
to the appropriate standard of care, and where there was sub-
stantial evidence from which a jury could have concluded that 
misstaking, if any, was not the defendant's fault, the trial 
court's grant of a new trial must be upheld. 
B. The Plaintiff Failed To Mitigate Its Damages. The 
other yround given by the trial court for its grant of a new 
trial was that the damayes were excessive. The jury awarded 
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damages of $30,000.00. The trial court apparently made this 
ruling either because it was convinced that the plaintiff 
had failed to mitigate its damages, or that the plaintiff 
simply did not suffer that great of damage. The latter 
issue will be addressed in subparagraph "C" of this Point. 
The defendant presented evidence that, at the time the 
error was discovered, in July 1974, the costs of correcting 
the error would have been approximately $3,000.00, and that 
repairs would have taken approximately ten days to complete. 
R.340-41. This proposed repair essentially involved 
the building about thirty feet •to the north, removing some of 
the concrete which had been poured, and pouring an additional 
pad of concrete on the north end of the building. R.336. 
The testimony concerning the costs of repair was given by 
Mr. Brown, who was a consulting engineer and who regularly 
designed buildings and did cost estimates. R.315, 339. 
This proposal, along with several others, was presented 
to Mr. Price, the principal of the plaintiff, on September 
13, 1974. The plaintiff had commenced this action, seeking 
damages of $895,000.00, a few days earlier, on September 9. 
R.220, 328, 436. At the September 13 meeting, Mr. Price summar: .. 
dismissed each of the proposals of the defendant, R.437, 
341-44, and proceeded at full steam to build the shopping 
center, making no other effort to mitigate the damages. 
The plaintiff objected to the evidence concerning the 
cost of correcting the error at the time it was discovered, 
contending that the defendant had not pleaded the plaintiff's 
-l2-
failure to mitigate damages as a'1 affirmative defense, and 
had therefore waived that defense. A similar issue was 
addressed by this court in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 
381 P.2d 86 (1963). Justice Crockett, speaking for the court 
in that case, comrne'1ted as follows: 
Plaintiff also raises the procedural point 
that since defendants did not plead the subse-
quent agreement as an affirmative defense, they 
should not have been permitted to rely thereon. 
It is true, as plaintiff insists, that Rule 8(c), 
U.R.C.P., requires that affirmative defenses be 
pleaded. It is a good rule whose purpose is to 
have the issues to be tried clearly framed. But 
it is not the only rule in the book of Rules of 
Civil Procedure. They must all be looked to in 
the light of their even more fundamental purpose 
of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to 
the end that parties are afforded the privilege 
of presenting whatever legitimate contentions 
they have pertaining to their dispute. What they 
are entitled to is notice of the issues raised 
and an opportunity to meet them. When this is 
accomplished, that is all that is required. Our 
rules provide for liberality to allow examina-
tion into and settlement of all issues bearing 
upon the controversy, but safeguard the rights of 
the other party to have a reasonable time to meet 
a new issue if he so requests. Rule lS(b), U.R.-
C.P., so states. It further allows for an amend-
ment to conform to the proof after trial or even 
after judgment, and indicates that if the ends 
of justice so require, "failure so to amend does 
'10t affect the result of the trial of these issues." 
This idea is confirmed by Rule 54(c)(l), U.R.C.P.: 
"(E]very final judgment shall grant the relief 
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded 
such relief in his pleadings." 
Although the plaintiff did object to evidence 
on the issue of subsequent agreement, when it was 
overruled, he made no request for a continuance 
nor did he make any representation to the court 
that he was take" by surprise or otherwise at a 
in meeting that issue. The trial 
court not only did not abuse his discretion in 
allowi'1g the issue to be raised a'1d receivi'1g the 
contract in evide:1ce, but he would have failed 
the plai'1 ma'1date of justice had he refused to do 
so. 
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381 P.2d at 91 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). See also 
Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P. 2d 966 (Utah lQf\21. 
Rule 8(c) does not specifically list "failure to m1tigat•" 
as an affirmative defense, however, arguendo, even if such were 
the case, the plaintiff clearly was aware well in advance of 
the trial that the defendant intended to assert that defense. 
For example, in answers to interrogatories submitted to the 
plaintiff over three years before the trial, the defendant 
stated that it would call witnesses to testify that "the proble· 
complained of by the plaintiff could have been eliminated with 
a moderate expenditure of time and money." R. 17-18. 
With good reason, the plaintiff did not claim surprise 
or request a continuance as a result of the evidence concern-
ing mitigation, but merely objected because of the procedural 
technicality. The court overruled the objection. "[Q] uestions 
of material and prejudicial variance between pleadings and 
proof, [citation], are peculiarly within the province of the 
trial court, and will be reversed only for an abuse ot discre-
tion." Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966, 
973 (Utah 1982). There is no indication that the court abused 
its discretion in allowing proof of the plaintiff's failure 
to mitigate its damages. 
The plaintiff had a duty to use reasonable care and 
diligence to avoid loss and to minimize its damaiJeS. '1orr 1 
Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772, 780 (194JI. l'umµetent 
evidence established that the off 1cers and 1t 
defendant, consulting engineers whu were ext)er1•:t.1._'1·,; l r, 
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designing such buildings and in estimating the construction 
costs, R.339, presented several possible means of curing 
the problem to Mr. Price. Mr. Price summarily dismissed 
each suggestion. R.437, 341-44. 
The defendant readily acknowledges that the plaintiff 
was not required to enter into other risky contracts, incur 
unreasonable inconvenience or expense, disorganize its busi-
ness, or incur other serious harm in the attempt to avoid 
harm. (Plaintiff's brief at 19.) The plaintiff was required, 
however, to take reasonable steps, in accordance with the 
rules of common sense and fair dealing, and to incur necessaEy 
trifling expenses, to mitigate the damages. Jankle v. Texas Co., 
88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425, 428 (1936). "The word 'trifling' 
in this connection has reference to the situation of the 
parties. It means a sum which is trifling in comparison with 
the consequential damages which the plaintiff is seeking to 
recover in the particular case." 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages 
§ 32 (1965). 
The test, again, on appeal, is not whether there was 
evidence from which a jury could have concluded that the plaintiff 
acted reasonably in rejecting the defendant's suggestions for 
repair, but rather whether there was substantial competent 
evidence from which a jury could have determined that the plain-
tiff acted unreasonably in summarily dismissing all suggestions 
as to how it might mitigate its damages. 
6S7 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982). 
Nelson v. Trujillo, 
Reasonable Jurors could have concluded, based on the 
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evidence presented, and Mr. Price did not act reasonably, 
not use common sense, and did :iot act fairly in summarily aci. 
without ser-ious consideration rejecting each of the defec,da1t' 
proposals for repair. There were no time commitments with re-
spect to the area of the building from which the space was 10s: 
R. 250. The jurors could therefore have also concluded that 3· 
extra expense of ten days and $3,000.00 would be a trifliC1g 
expense when compared with damages which were claimed at the 
time to be $825,000.00, R.436, and which were later claimed 
to be at least $83,000.00, R.11. Jurors could have concludea 
that it was not reasonable for Mr. Price to not even ask his 
architect to redesign the project to include the lost space. 
R.234-35, 250, 277-78. The trial judge, who heard all the 
evidence, determined that a new trial should be granted, aC1d 
his decision should be affirmed. 
C. The Plaintiff Suffered No Damages. Substantial com-
petent evidence was presented at trial that the shopping ceC1te: 
as finally constructed, was in violation of Orem City Ordi-
nances, in that it had too few parking spaces for the amouC1t 
of retail and restaurant space. Although the plaintiff arguea 
that it had been deprived of an additional 2100 square feet 
of floor space, construction of the additional space would 
have been illegal. 
It is well-established that an award of damages based 01 
violation of the law is against public policy. There are 
:iumerous occasio:is i:i which courts have had aci ''[lpnrtuci: t:; t·. 
deal with an illegal use. O:ie such area :s that ()t- f::.rn:1C'-1t 
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domai:i. It is well-established that any evidence relating 
to an unlawful use of the property when condemnation pro-
ceedi:igs are instituted is not admissible to prove the value 
of the land. 4 Nicholas on Eminent Domain § 12.3143 (3d ed. 
1981). As stated by the Arizona Supreme Court in Gear v. City 
of Phoenix, 93 Ariz. 260, 379 P.2d 972 (1972): 
If the ordinances are a reasonable exercise of 
the City's police power . . the avail-
ability of land for a use which is prohibited 
by law cannot be considered in determining its 
value in eminent domain proceedings. 
379 P.2d at 974 (citations omitted). 
In this case, the ordinances of Orem City were established 
and the agents and employees of Orem City testified to their 
implementation. In tort, the plaintiff is prohibited from 
putting on evidence of damages which result from activities 
or situations prohibited by statutes or ordinances. Further, 
illegal contracts cannot be enforced nor can damages be awarded 
based upon the implementation or performance which results from 
the contract. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 155-73 ( 1964). 
The plaintiff attempted to prove damages by establishing 
the value of an imaginary 2100 square feet of retail space 
which was not constructed and which, if constructed, would 
be a patent violation of the Orem City Ordinances. It is 
clear that the plaintiff in fact suffered no damage in the 
eyes of the law. The trial court was therefore correct in 
stat1ny that the damages awarded were excessive, and in 
ordering a new trial. 
POINT II 
JOHN PRICE ASSOCIATES, INC., WAS AN INDIS-
PENSABLE PARTY AND THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
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TO DISMISS THE ACTION UPON PLAINTIFF'S ELECTION 
NOT TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT WAS PROPER. 
To the extent that plaintiff's claim against defendant 
sounds in contract, John Price Associates, Inc., (JPA) is a 
necessary and indispensable party, and the trial court was 
proper in dismissing the action for plaintiff's failure to 
join JPA. 
It is undisputed that the only binding contract 
the defendant was a purchase order issued by JPA requiring 
defendant "to stake building layout with twenty five (25) 
foot offsets, stake parking lot and rain water sump. Not to 
exceed $330.00. Stake curb and gutter not to exceed $270.00. 
R. 256, 209-11. Defendant did not enter into any contract 
with plaintiff and was under no contractual duty to plaintiff 
to perform the survey. On the basis of these facts, there is 
simply no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant, 
and there is no way plaintiff can sue on a contract theory 
without bringing in JPA. 
Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
every action to be prosecuted "in the name of the real party 
in interest." The real party in interest is the party who 
has the right to sue under the substantive law applicable 
to the case. John Price Associates and the defendant, Roll:ns, ' 
Brown, & Gunnell, were the only parties that had privity of 
contract; therefore, the plaintiff, Price-Orem Investment 
Company, is not the real party in interest and it does not 
have standing to bri'.lg this actio'.l agai'.lst the detenda'.lt. 
The very foundations of contract law prevecit "''-' "'he• :s 
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not a party to a contract from maintaining a suit on it 
unless the contract expressly provides that it is for the 
benefit of a third party. This fundamental rule is recognized 
in Staley v. New, 56 N.M. 756, 250 P.2d 893 (1952), wherein 
the court held that in absence of a contractual relation 
between the owners of a home and the architect who drew up 
plans and specifications for a heating system, the owners 
could not sue the architect for breach of contract or warranty 
when the system failed to heat the house adequately. See 
also Ekstrom United Supply Co. v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland 
Cement Co., 194 Kan. 634, 400 P.2d 707 (1965) (there is no 
privity of contract between a subcontractor and an owner); 
Watson v. Aced, 156 Cal. App. 2d 87, 319 P.2d 83 (1957) (the 
general rule is that one may not sue upon contract unless he 
is party to that contract). 
In its brief, plaintiff claims that a contract existed 
between plaintiff and defendant on the grounds that defendant 
admitted this fact in its pleadings. This allegation, how-
ever, fails to recognize that following the District Court's 
grant of a new trial, the court granted defendant's motion 
to amend its answer. In the amended answer, the defendant 
set forth as its sixth affirmative defense the fact that the 
pla:ntiff is not the real party in interest. 
Furthermore, substantial evidence was presented 
jnd accepted by the court at the first trial establishing 
thdt Jefendant's to survey the property was with 
T F' .; d 1 • l 10 'ne l 3 e . R. 204-11. 
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to this line of questioning, and, therefore, is precluded 
from raising that issue on appeal. 
As the real party in interest, JPA is a necessary and 
indispensable party under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of C1v1l 
Procedure: 
(a) Necessary Joinder. Subject to the provi-
sions of Rule 23 and subdivision (b) of this Rule, 
having a joint interest shall be made 
parties and be joined on the same side as plain-
tiffs or defendants. When a person who should 
join as a plaintiff refuses to do so, or his 
consent cannot be obtained, he may be made a 
defendant or. in orooer c"ases. an involuntarv 
olaintiff. 
Plaintiff araues that because JPA was not damaaed it had 
no interest with olaintiff and. therefore. is not an ind1s-
oensable or necessarv oartv. This construction of the 
"ioint interest" reauirement. however. is far too narrow and 
should not be aoolied. Incurrina damaae is certainl•; not the 
onlv thina that creates a 1oint interst. if JPA 
is the one that contracted with defendant to do the survevinn 
and the contract was not oerformed accordina to its terms. JPM 
has an interest in enforcing its contract rights. Further-
more, the rules, which merely incorporate the case 
decisions reached at common law, further support the position 
that inasmuch as the plaintiff is suing on contract, JPA is 
an "indispensable or necessary" party. Rule 19(a) ·)f thf' 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states thctt J part; shctll 
be joined in an action if: 
(1) in his absence complete relief c1:1r,0t 
be accorded among tl1ose alrectd,· ['-'rt1es, .,;: 
(2) he clctims ctn interest rel.1t111< t, Sul 
ject Of the dCtlOrl -ind lS srJ SltU'-it Pd t-l"--it_ t::r' 
disposition of the Jcl1•Jn in i:is ,i,.•;c·r.· 
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(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest, or (ii) 
leave any of the persons already parties sub-
Ject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obliga-
tions by reason of his claimed interest. 
Under the common law, therefore, as reflected in the 
federal rules, complete relief cannot be accorded Price-Orem 
Investment, since it had no privity of contract with Rollins, 
Brown & Gunnel, and its only course of action would be against 
John Price Associates, Inc. The continuation of the suit 
without John Price Associates would also leave Rollins, Brown 
& Gunnell subject to a substantial risk of incurring a double 
or inconsistent obligation because of the possibility of an 
action on its contract with John Price Associates. 
As an alternative basis for liability, plaintiff contends 
that even in the absence of a contract between it and the 
defendant, it may nevertheless recover for negligence. To 
the extent, however, that the defendant's cause of action 
sounds in tort, it must fail for lack of duty. 
It is axiomatic that "[a] finding of negligence requires 
the presence of certain elements, one of which is a duty running 
between the parties." Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250, 1253 
(Ct ah 19 7 9) . 
In tlusiinell v. Sillitoe, 550 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1976), which 
i:1·.'ol•.'ed a c; 1c.·";in,; error similar to that in the instant case, 
property 01v·r1c·rs brc.u·jht an action against the encroaching pro-
µerty title company, which had also constructed the 
l11n11L', unJ Lt1e firm responsible for sur-
property boundary, and as a result, the defendants' home en-
croached nine feet four inches (9'4") into the plaintiffs' 
land. The Bushnell court held that the surveyor "owed no 
duty to the adjoining landowners" because the surveyors' 
duty "arose out of a contract to survey the premises." 550 
P.2d at 1285. Due to the procedural posture of the case, 
the court Vias not presented with the issue which is critical 
in the instant case, that of whether the surveyor owed a duty 
of care to the landowner. On that issue, the court simply 
stated that "[t]his court has never ruled as to whether there 
must be privity of contract between a surveyor and a party 
who sustains damage, because of a surveyor's negligent mis-
representation." 550 P.2d at 1286. 
The defendant submits that, particularly under the facts 
of this case, privity of contract is necessary in order to 
find a duty owed by the defendant in performing the survey. 
If a contractual relationship did not exist between the de-
fendant and the plaintiff, Price-Orem Investment Company, no 
duty existed on the part of Rollins, Brown, & Gunnell toward 
Price-Orem Investment, and a cause of action of negligence wiL 
not lie. 
In its brief, plaintiff cites a Utah case and a Californ:a 
case to support his contention that defendant, a surveyor, owe 
a duty to plaintiff, owner of the land. As set forth below, 
a review of these cases reveals that they are distinyuishaDle 
and the fact that a duty was found in those cases does not 
compel a finding of duty in the case at bar. 
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Even though the court in Bushnell, supra, expressly left 
open the question of duty between a surveyor and a party not 
in privity of contract, plaintiff relies on this case as 
authority by claiming that the court in its opinion adopted 
Restatement of Torts, 2a § 552, which reads as follows: 
One who in the course of his business or pro-
fession supplies information for the guidance 
of others in their business transactions is 
subject to liability for harm caused to them 
by their reliance upon the information if (a) 
he fails to exercise that care and competence 
in obtaining and communicating the information 
which its recipient is justified in expecting, 
and (b) the harm is suffered (i) by the per-
son or one of the class of persons for whose 
guidance the information was supplied, and (ii) 
because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a 
transaction in which it was intended to intlu-
ence his conduct or in a transaction substan-
tially identical therewith. 
550 P.2d at 1286 4. 
From the above-cited language, it is clear that the 
touchstone of this rule is reliance. One who supplies infor-
rnation is liable only if another relies on the information 
and is harmed as a result of that reliance. Thus, it appears 
that in this narrow context where one supplying information 
may have a duty to one not in privity, reliance on the infor-
rnation is a prerequisite to the existence of that duty. This 
construction is supported not only by the above-cited 
Res_t::_aternen_t:_ rule, but also by the cases cited in plaintiff's 
ln M:lliner v. Elmer Fox and Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 
14(4), the court denied recovery to plaintiff purchasers of 
stock as he:ny part of an unl:rnited class, and stressed the 
-c3-
element of reliance in formulating its holding: 
We are of the opinion that the lack of privity 
is not a defense where an accountant who is 
aware of the fact that his work will be relied 
on by a party or parties who may extend credit 
to his client or assume his client's obliga-
tions. 
592 P.2d at 808 (emphasis added). Thus, it is evident that 
the court was willing to waive the privity requirement, but 
only to the extent of allowing recovery by those that the 
accountant knew would rely on his information. 
The same element of reliance is present i" _K_e_n_t _ v_._B_a_r_t_l_e_t: ! 
I 
49 Cal. App. 3d 724, 122 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1975), and Rozny v. 
Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969), which the plai1L: I 
also cites. In both these cases, as in the i'lstant case, the 
landowners brought actions against the surveyors for damages 
resulting from faulty surveys. However, the courts held that 
the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiffs even though '10 
privity was present only because the plai'ltiffs had purchased 
their property in reliance on the faulty surveys. 
By contrast, the plaintiff i'1 the instant case was not 
harmed as a result of reliance on defenda:"lt's survey, because 
the plaintiff did not rely 0'1 the survey. Indeed, it had 
no cause to rely. Furthermore, although there is co'lflicti:i; 
evidence, it was established at trial that the pla1:itif E k:iew 
about the mistake in the survey before a'ly suhsta'.1tial act::" 
was taken. It is submitted, therefore, that the lack of rel'.3 
on plaintiff's part prevents these cases from co:itrolli:iy 
This is not a case of a LLird ,.arty >ot :• 
privity taking some detrime'.1tal actirn in r»L,:nc» 
on defendant's survey, Plaintiff chose its course of action 
with full knowledge of the error in the location of the 
building. In contrast to the plaintiffs in Kent who pur-
chased land relying on the validity of the survey, the 
plaintiff in this case was already the owner of the land. 
If anyone relied on this survey, it was John Price Associates, 
Inc., which ordered the survey and for whose guidance the 
survey was made. 
If the court follows the elements of Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 552, even if all of the other elements of the rule 
are satisfied, the plaintiff cannot in good faith claim that 
it felied on this survey in taking any action and, therefore, 
the defendant was not under any duty to the plaintiff. While 
this Court may at some future time extend the duty of surveyors 
to those who Justifiably rely on their professional judgment, 
it would be manifestly unjust to find such a duty absent re-
liance. To do so would be to distort the same rule to achieve 
two anomalous results; namely, denying recovery to purchasers 
of stock who innocently relied on the information of an 
accountant, Milliner, supra, while permitting recovery by a 
landm,ncr exercised no reliance. Such a result would be 
unjust and inconsistent and the defendant respect-
f" 11 1" JdC'Stt> that the Court reJect the specious argument in 
A•t<<L'tet rcedl m1sch1cf of the plaintiff's failure to join 
r. Jl1 1'1 L _'l' :\S:.,1c13tes is th.=it it, by procrastination or design, 
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allowed the case to set dormant for more than five years bef,,,, 
being activated over the defendant's motion to dismiss for 
failure to prosecute. By that time the pleadings had become 
stale, and the defendant had been led to believe that the 
plaintiff was not sincere in its claim. After five years the 
defendant could not then raise its defenses or third-party 
complaints against John Price Associates, Inc. Certainly if 
the plaintiff's claim is founded in tort, it would be reason-
able to compare the negligence of .JPA, which is another good 
reason for finding JPA a necessary and indispensable party. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's grant of a new trial should be upheld, 
as there was substantial competent evidence which would support 
a judgment for the defendant. No expert or other evidence was 
presented to show that the defendant was negligent, and, in 
fact, the evidence established that the defendant performed 
the staking and survey in accordance with the standards in 
the industry. Substantial evidence showed that the plaintiff 
could have cured the problem with a very minimal expenditure 
of time and money, but that the plaintiff failed to mitigate 
its damages. Finally, there was substantial competent evidence 
that the plaintiff suffered no damage, as the plaintiff did 
not have adequate parking for the structures which were 
and any additional space would have been in violation of tne 
applicable zoning ordinances. 
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The trial court's order of dismissal for failure to join 
an indispensable party was also correct. John Price Associates, 
Inc., was the only party with whom the defendant had contracted, 
and to whom the defendant owed a duty. The defendant owed no 
duty to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff did not reasonably rely 
on the work performed by the defendant. 
The respondent-defendant therefore respectfully submits 
that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed in all 
respects. 
DATED this ,Jlf.1 day of October, 1983. 
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